On February 5, 2010, President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev put his signature to the text of the country`s new Military Doctrine.1 This document has been causing much concern among experts in recent months. Its ratification was postponed for a few times, and Nikolai Patrushev, head of the Security Council, blamed slight technical problems for the delay.

Forecasts made in mass media last December sounded gloomy: some sources, for example, cited Gen. Mahmout Gareyev, President of the Academy of Military Sciences, who said that the ratification of the Military Doctrine would take place after Russia and US sign a new strategic arms reduction treaty. But according to recent reports, the two countries will be ready to achieve the deal not before the middle of the year. Actually, such forecasts did not sound convincing: it is unwise to draw a parallel between a doctrine and a strategic international agreement.

As of today, all the questions have been removed. The military doctrine, which covers the next 10 years, is signed. Unlike the 1993 and the 2000 versions, this document has undergone some structural changes. It contains definitions of military security, military threat, of local, regional and large-scale war, and of a state`s military structure. A separate chapter is devoted to internal and external military danger and probable threats and conflicts our country may once get involved.

At the top of the list of threats we find NATO`s attempts to play a global role despite evident violation of international legislation, and the alliance`s eastward expansion to the Russian borders. Next comes the US anti-missile defense shield, which undermines global stability, existing balance of power in nuclear sphere and also speeds up the militarisation of space.

The doctrine also focuses on the use of new means of weapons in military campaigns- high-precision laser or infrared arms, and also unmanned aircrafts and autonomous underwater vehicles.

Apparently, Russia sees it as its prior task to prevent a nuclear and any other kind of conflict. It is stressed that the use of troops to repel agression against Russia or its allies or to carry out peacekeeping operations initiated by the UN Security Council is legitimate. Tasks which can be assigned on the army in peaceful time are also included in the list.

Unlike the 2000 doctrine, the new one determines the means to guarantee the country`s military and economic defense. Modern equipment for the army and other kinds of troops is viewed as financial basis they need. In view of this, the situation in the national defense industry is considered a priority. However, there is nothing revolutionary about all this.

It is remarkable that a provision concerning the use of nukes in Russia vanished from the doctrine at the very last moment. This provision read that being a nuclear state, Russia regained its right for nuclear deterrence. Together with the Military Doctrine, Mr. Medvedev approved ''The Principles of state policy on nuclear deterrence through 2020''. Although this document contains classified information, it does not make a big deal of it actually: the use of nukes depends on the situation and intentions of a possible enemy, and an attack is not ruled out in case the national security is at risk.

By the time the doctrine was due to be approved, this provision was removed: now even a preemptive attack is not allowed under any circumstances. The country may use nuclear weapons only in a retaliatory attack.

In fact, this commitment goes directly from the Soviet military doctrine, though of course the situation with strategic nuckear forces in Russia has changed drastically over the past 10 years.

But some reports are still misleading as they say Russia has the right to make a preemptive attack.2

Well, if the text of the new military doctrine says nothing about preemptive attack, does it mean that when the opposite sides fail to compromise, those who stand up for Russia`s mild defence standards automatically win?

Nowadays, when none of the nuclear states, except Russia and US, participate in the reduction of nuclear weapons, and when dozens new countries are free to develop nuclear energy, Russia is running huge risks focusing on non-nuclear world.

Under these circumstances, a non-nuclear world would mean a step back to the pre-nuclear era, when large-scale wars were real, but with Russia possessing no nukes to prevent conflicts.

Some journalists are citing the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, who last October said the US would abandon preemptive nuclear attacks. But this citation won`t do because each country cares about its national security relying on its own perceptions of national defence. Besides, we should not forget that today Washington already possesses more nuclear warheads and high-precision non-nuclear weapons than Russia does.

NATO`s Chief, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, was maybe even too quick to comment on the debates about Russia`s new military doctrine. Duirng an interview with Reuters on the sidelines of the Security Conference in Munich last week, Mr. Rasmussen described the doctrine as 'not objective' and 'undermining attempts to improve relations between Russia and NATO'. ''NATO is not threatening Russia, neither it is its enemy'', Rasmussen told the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov ahead of the conference in Munich. NATO`s Chief did not seem to bother about the fact that a day before the text of the new doctrine was published, Romania confirmed its agreement to place US interceptor missiles on its territory, while Poland said it would welcome a US missilebase. Quite unexpected (or,maybe, on the contrary-expected?) result of the reset in Russia-US relations.

Speaking at the Munich Security Conference, Mr. Lavrov stressed that the West still ignores the issue of the indivisibility of security and Moscow`s initiative to achieve a new European Security Treaty, which could serve as a mechanism to settle the most complicated international conflicts.