The Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s victory in the presidential election held on January 26 becomes a defining moment for regional security. The speed with which western countries endorsed his victory has a deeper meaning than what meets the eye insofar as it came at the culmination of a barrage of incessant criticism of the Rajapaksa regime for the past several months. In essence, it was in the nature of making amends and swiftly coming to terms with a fait accompli. It followed the unwarranted interference by the American embassy in Colombo during the peak of the election campaign expressing concern over a free and fair election.

Given the presidential system of government, Rajapaksa was destined to be more equal than other candidates but in the ultimate analysis, his victory was convincing. In the event, the opposition alliance’s decision to field ex-army chief Sarath Fonseka as its common candidate worked in Rajapaksa’s favor. Indeed, Fonseka lacked the charisma and political savviness to take on an old warhorse like Rajapaksa.

But the election result has thrown up faultlines. Despite the Fonseka gaffe, the opposition alliance’s vote bank probably remains intact at around 40 percent, which underscores an appreciable level of public disaffection over the Rajapakse regime. It holds implications for the parliamentary elections due very shortly.

Again, the Sinhala electorate voted overwhelmingly for Rajapaksa, while Fonseka polled surprisingly well in the minority Tamil and Muslim-dominated regions of north, northeast and the central highlands. How Rajapaksa defines his mandate of Sinhala nationalism remains an open question, which would have bearing on his approach to the Tamil problem that has torn apart the country for several decades.

India has reason to be quietly pleased with Rajapaksa’s victory. In the Indian estimation, a strong leadership in Colombo will be best placed to take tough decisions while addressing the Tamil problem. Though the military victory over the Tamil separatists has been conclusive, peace is far from won and deep wounds take time to heal. The time is approaching to reflect and begin to prepare a road map.

However, this is also where Rajapaksa’s “fractured” verdict becomes problematic. Sinhala nationalism historically acted as a brake on Colombo’s political willingness to accommodate the Tamil minority aspirations. To what extent Rajapaksa dares to break the old paradigm is the big question. The Sinhala regions of the rural south, which gave him rock-like support, also happen to be the heartland of chauvinism that thrives on the atavistic fears of Sri Lanka being the last remaining bastion of Theravada Buddhism.

Delhi has to tread warily while deploying its persuasive power with Rajapaksa to advance a political settlement of the Tamil problem, which is critical to the region’s security. Having extended unstinted support to Colombo’s war effort against the LTTE, Delhi ought to harness the peace dividends, but appearances can sometimes be deceptive. The plain truth is that India now deals with a vastly strengthened Rajapaksa and the alchemy of the obscure political interdependence between Delhi and Colombo may have incrementally transformed to the latter’s advantage.

Meanwhile, an entirely new template is straining to appear in the Sri Lankan political landscape. Without doubt, the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean region is shifting. The United States is determined to fasten the “contested commons” in the Indian Ocean, which connect the Persian Gulf with the South China Sea. Indian Ocean also happens to be a vital artery for China’s economy. A recent study “Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a Multipolar World” by the Center for a New American Century, an influential Washington-based think tank, bemoans that the US’s military dominance over the global commons is being increasingly challenged by new powers with “potentially hostile strategies and doctrine”. The study expounds a new strategy in the US policy and posture so as to “develop capabilities to defend and sustain the global commons, preserve its military freedom of action in commons that are contested, and cultivate capabilities that will enable effective military operations when a commons is unusable or inaccessible.”

Sri Lanka becomes a vital chip in this great game. Paradoxically, the great game multiplies Colombo’s options. Rajapaksa is already a beneficiary of sorts. All the Anglo-American pressure on Rajapaksa over his alleged war crimes came to nothing ultimately due to Moscow and Beijing’s support for him in the United Nations. In turn, Washington has been compelled to reassess the wisdom of driving Rajapaksa to a corner – just as it was forced into a radical rethink on the Myanmar regime.

But Rajapaksa is a tough grassroots politician. More important, he is a homegrown politician who owes nothing to any foreign power for his ascendancy in Sinhala politics. Equally, he is an “outsider” to the traditionally western-oriented Colombo elite. In all likelihood, Rajapaksa will offer a level playing field to any country that can help him tide over the grave crisis in the Sri Lankan economy, but he can be trusted to keep the leash in his hands. His natural inclination will be to mend fences with the US but he will have a bottom line when it comes to the sensitive issues related to the conduct of the brutal war against the Tamil separatists.

China is a serious investor today and is willing to put big money on the table where its core interests are involved. And Sri Lanka is a key country for China. The island’s importance is bound to further increase as China makes headway in developing alternate transportation route to the Gulf region via Myanmar that bypasses Malacca Straits. The US will be hard-pressed to match Beijing’s political tenacity and financial prowess in raising the stakes in Colombo. All the same, so long as Sri Lanka’s Tamil problem remains unresolved, there is ample scope for the US to create pressure points on Rajapaksa. According to the Colombo grapevine, Rajapaksa is likely to visit Russia in the near future. This will be his first visit abroad after the election.

India too has choices to make. India did well to mark its distance from the brouhaha raised by the West about Rajapaksa’s human rights record. The US expects to rope in India as an accomplice in its strategy to counter China’s influence in Sri Lanka. But India has its specific interests in Sri Lanka. Also, despite the vicissitudes in India-Sri Lanka ties, which are endemic to two neighboring countries of such manifest asymmetry, India will always remain a privileged partner. India’s challenge is to figure out how to enrich the partnership with greater content – much the same challenge that it faces with all its neighbours.