Being the key player having influence over the August, 2009 elections in Afghanistan, the US has not demonstrated its preferences explicitly, but there is a widespread impression that Washington no longer trusts H. Karzai. The reason is not that he did anything wrong or defied the US control. Simply protégés should never be permanent least they gain positions strong enough to feel independent or the forces having no obligations to the US overthrow the pro-US corrupt regime, popular support for which is rapidly evaporating. It is an indication of the above that the so-called “orange” technologies are currently resurfacing in Afghanistan. On August, 29 several hundred residents of the provinces where Karzai was far ahead of competitors in the electoral race held a rally in Kabul in support of the current opposition leader and former Afghan foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah, an ethnic Tajic. The event was led by a group of people known as the public opinion champions among the Pashtun population. They called Abdullah not to capitulate and to go on struggling against the incumbent whom they likened to a trapped beast. Abdullah clearly felt re-energized by the expressions of support and – quite predictably – declared he would not recognize the official election results as they had been rigged.

Generally, it is normal for a politician determined to ascend to power to cite election irregularities ahead of the completion of the official count. Nor is it unnatural for people to gather to express support for their candidate. Yet, Afghanistan is a country where voters hardly ever favor candidates not belonging to their own ethnic groups, and the fact that Pashtuns traveled a long way to Kabul to express solidarity in front of TV cameras with an ethnic Tajic is highly suggestive of the involvement of foreign puppeteers in the process. Toppling Karzai is not necessarily a part of the agenda of the latter, and chances are they are still ready to deal with him. The plan can be limited to making Karzai realize to what extent he is vulnerable, insecure, and dependent on the coalition forces deployed in Afghanistan.

The main question is not whether Karzai is going to be ousted or just weakened. The circumstance of fundamental importance is that – contrary to Washington's persistent claims - the US does not want a credible central government in Afghanistan. Establishing a strong pro-US regime in the country would take its direct occupation with the pouring of forces and money into it in quantities much greater than what is currently being allocated or what the US and its allies can potentially afford. It is clear that no strong pro-US regime can rise in Afghanistan naturally due to the population's dislike for the US. Contrary to that, the emergence of an anti-American regime based on an alliance of tribes united by common opposition to the occupation appears to be a realistic scenario. Therefore, the option best for the US is Afghanistan having no serious central authority whatsoever and a government in Kabul totally dependent on Washington. The inability of such government to control most of Afghanistan's territory would not be regarded as a major problem by the US as in fact Washington would in certain ways be able to additionally take advantage of the situation.

The US objectives in Afghanistan should be assessed with a healthy amount of realism. It is no secret that, having occupied the country, the US has practically no control over its territory outside the coalition's military bases, but is that really seen as a problem in Washington? The US never intended to maintain its military presence in every Afghan village. Control over the territory of Afghanistan is seen in Washington as something completely different. Information about the country is being collected by satellites, drones, and an extensive network of agents, while the US forces do not have to be present literally in every part of Afghanistan facing the risks of sudden attacks. Unlike Hitler's Germany, the US harbored no plans to move its citizens to inhabit the conquered space where it would permanently have to protect them from the Talibs. The US objectives concerning the Afghan territory are a lot more sophisticated.

The US has deployed 19 military bases in Afghanistan and Central Asian countries since the war began in October, 2001. These bases function autonomously from the surrounding space, are networked by airlifts, and get supplies from outside of Afghanistan, also mostly by air. The system of bases makes it possible for the US to exert military pressure on Russia, China, and Iran. As for Russia, this is a manifestation of the long-term US geopolitical strategy aimed at separating Russia from seas and locking it up in the Eurasian inland. More advanced phases of the strategy envision the US advancement deep into Eurasia, the gaining of positions in it that would weaken Russia's control over its territory, and – eventually – the elimination of the Russian statehood in Siberia and the Far East. Considering that in any war the US mainly relies on its air force, the above strategy can be implemented with the help of a network of isolated bases and does not require control over the entire territory of Afghanistan.

Still, a major war is an extreme option, and the US has much more sophisticated instruments at its disposal. It skillfully exports chaos to other countries and regions thus creating such situations in them that normal economic activities and development become impossible. As a result, financial resources and intellectual workforce from the regions are forced to flee and seek safer places, which mean the US in practice. The corresponding financial inflow partially offsets the US trade balance deficit and prevents the US dollar from collapsing, while the immigration of intellectual workforce to the US makes it possible for the country to maintain its technological leadership globally.

The US does not need a final victory over the Talibs. Despite their widely advertized ferocious conflict, the US and the Talibs manage to coexist quite successfully in Afghanistan. The US is demonstrating its presence and building up the infrastructure it is based on, as well as collecting intelligence data. In the meantime the Talibs are attacking police stations, robbing convoys with humanitarian aid – and also demonstrating their presence. The Talibs do perpetrate terrorist acts targeting the US and NATO servicemen. The US responds by launching efficient raids which occasionally include incursions into Pakistan and thus broaden the scope of the drama. In general, the US and the Talibs in Afghanistan are not all that incompatible.

With Washington's non-intervention if not downright encouragement, the Talibs are destabilizing Central Asia and the Uyghur regions of China as well as seek inroads into Iran. This is the explanation behind the recent upheaval of the Uyghur separatism and to an extent behind the activity of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Regional instabilities both are bred by the US presence in Afghanistan and adjacent countries and serve to justify prolonging the presence indefinitely. It is increasingly clear that the US is not going to withdraw from Afghanistan to which Obama's Administration is currently shifting forces from Iraq. There is permanent consensus in the ranks of the US establishment that the US presence in Afghanistan must continue.