The last months were marked with swift intensification of the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Amidst the upheaval caused by the escalation (the test-firing of a long-range missile by North Korea, its nuclear test, and the passing of a “punitive” resolution by the UN Security Council) political circles and the expert community are weighting the potential consequences of the developments for the overall situation in North East Asia and for the future of the denuclearization in the region in particular.
Whatever motivation there might have been behind the uncompromising stance adopted by the North Korean leadership, what it has actually managed to achieve is to antagonize essentially the entire international community and to perpetuate the isolation of its country. If Pyongyang meant to impress its neighbors with its military might and thus to drag the US into bilateral talks, clearly the approach has failed.
Though the discussions of the resolution draft in the UN Security Council took longer than expected, this time the rift between the hardliners (the US, Japan, and South Korea) and North Korea’s traditional friends (China and Russia) was not as wide as usual, and the differences were mostly tactical. The only requirements formulated by Beijing and Moscow were that the resolution should not greenlight a military solution or strangulate the North Korean economy and that it should stress the importance of addressing the problems of the Korean Peninsula by diplomatic means. As for the essence of the matter, there was understanding in the UN Security Council from the start that the response to the steps taken by North Korea should be resolute and efficient. As a result, Resolution 1874 carried a package of sanction-type measures ranging from the military to financial ones.
Most experts agree that the current problems centered around North Korea are bound to persist. Forecasts include a boost of the arms race in the region, especially in the sphere of developing national and regional missile defense systems as well as the faster formation and strengthening of US-led multilateral alliances involving America’s traditional partners such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea. Quite possibly, other small nations will find North Korea’s example worthy of imitating and opt for upgrading their defense potentials with nuclear and missile capabilities.
Notably, recently Seoul started reacting to the situation by requesting that Washington provide to it written guarantees of accepting South Korea under the nuclear umbrella like the one with which the US currently protects Japan. After a brief period of hesitation the US agreed to accommodate its ally’s demand and the corresponding statement was incorporated into the joint statement made following the June 16 visit of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak to Washington. At the moment the question is whether the US nuclear infrastructure previously withdrawn from South Korea is going to be redeployed in the country.
It is a paradox that the traditional opponents – the US and DPRK – seem to agree on at least one but possibly the most significant issue: both hold that the six-party talks on the Korean denuclearization are dead and no chance to revive them looms on the horizon. North Korea states bluntly that it will never consent to not having nuclear deterrence forces and that it plans “to keep building up its defensive nuclear potential at the face of the US threat”. It also says that it is opening a uranium enrichment program in addition to the existing plutonium one. The uranium program, though, is said to be linked to the plan to build a light-water reactor and provision of latter by nuclear fuel rather than to any military objectives.
As for the US, it stresses the need to implement thoroughly the sanctions prescribed by Resolution 1874, especially those which are meant to cut off any channels for Pyongyang’s illegal financial transactions or the export of UN-banned equipment, materials, and technologies from North Korea. Practically, the regime can translate into the enforcement of inspections of North Korean ships in the high seas. The resolution says inspections are formally possible, but in every case require the consent of the ship owner and captain. Washington, however, is known not to regard the international law as a holy cow. Needless to say, a conflict between the two countries in the sea can have far-reaching consequences considering North Korea’s determination to protect its sovereignty at any cost.
Though Washington does not officially object to resolving the North Korean nuclear problem by diplomatic means, certain influential circles in the US are floating the idea that dealing with the current Pyongyang administration simply makes no sense. It is alarming that US commentators are increasingly assertive about the need to put together a plan that can be used in case the current North Korean regime collapses and the situation is taken under “exterior control”, in particular with the purpose of preventing the leaks of nuclear or other dangerous materials from the country. In other words, there is an intention in the US to link the settlement at the Korean Peninsula with the regime change in Pyongyang or even with a change of the political system in North Korea.
Truly speaking, this is not the predominantly held view on the issue in the US, and Washington’s new position on North Korea is still in the formative phase. Moreover, recently we heard more often about the advantages of diplomatic methods and the need to keep the six-party process afloat.
Naturally there are other positions between the two extremes espoused by Pyongyang and Washington. South Korea, for example, is eager to reduce the discussions of the nuclear agenda to the five-party format with a door “slightly open” for North Korea. Seoul’s logic rests on the assumption that at the moment it is better to keep doing at least something – thus keeping the negotiating process alive – than nothing at all. According to South Korea’s plan, the five nations should devise a package of political and economic incentives North Korea can get as a reward for denucleaization. The idea has a certain appeal but definitely lacks realism, at least judging by the way Beijing reacts to it.
So far China has not put the finishing touches on its position. In line with its political tradition Beijing tends to study in detail how the situation evolves before issuing any statements. As the country which organized the six-party talks, China did more work than any other in the hope that they would produce appreciable results and is interested more than others in not having the efforts wasted.
Moscow also invested heavily in the six-party process, planning to transform it in the more distant future into a permanent forum dealing with the security climate in North East Asia. Both China and Russia are concerned more than other countries that further development of North Korea’s nuclear program can trigger a wave on nuclearization in the region.
At the same time, it should be realized that from Russia’s standpoint the situation is not as loaded with risks as some commentators portray it. Russia fulfilled its obligations in the six-party framework honestly and fully, generated broad, package-based concepts of resolving the North Korean nuclear problem which were never useless, and helped its partners whenever problems with the dialog arose. No doubt, it is sad that the negotiating process has collapsed and the situation has regressed, but this is by no means Russia’s fault. Under the existing circumstances, Russia should exercise caution, avoid competing with other countries in generating half-baked ideas, and avoid being drawn into any potentially risky combinations.
One of the reasons why Moscow was hurt by Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the six-party talks was that Russia had entirely fulfilled its obligations including the financial ones. Unlike some other participants, Russia delivered the 200,000 tons of fuel oil worth approximately $100 mln as a part of the compensation package and now it has to realize that the money was wasted. This experience should teach Russia caution in planning likewise steps in the future.
The North Korean nuclear problem has been evolving in cycles for 17 years. Various recipes of resolving it had been thrown in over the time, but recoveries were invariably followed by recurrent periods of confrontation. The present crisis may be unprecedented but intuition predicts that we can expect a new cycle – possibly with a new configuration and new players - after today’s grievances become a matter of the past.
As of today, Russia’s interests in the security sphere have not been seriously affected. It takes a total receptiveness and unwarranted trustfulness to the US propaganda to imagine that the less than modest North Korean nuclear and missile potential tailored to very narrowly defined objectives can present a military threat to Russia. What really deserves attention is how the West is going to take advantage of the reckless steps taken by Pyongyang to tilt the military balance in North East Asia in its favor. Such process should be monitored narrowly.
Moscow has reasons to be seriously concerned over the possible expansion of the military infrastructure of the US and its allies in direct proximity of Russia’s borders and over the buildup of their attack potential under the pretext of the crisis around North Korea.
The poor technological level of North Korean nuclear and missile forces, particularly in what concerns maintaining the security and safety of their own existence, breeds the risk of man-caused catastrophes to which Russia’s Far East can be exposed.
Another security threat stems from the possibility of aimed strikes against North Korean nuclear installations which is occasionally discussed in the US. The potential results of Pyongyang’s response to such limited aggression (the latter may be harsh and large-scale one) are a separate theme.
